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ABSTRACT 
Despite strong support for the efficacy of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for social 
anxiety disorder (SAD), little is known about mechanisms of change in treatment. Within 
the context of a randomized controlled trial of CBT, this study examined patients’ beliefs 
about the fixed versus malleable nature of anxiety – their ‘implicit theories’ – as a key 
variable in CBT for SAD. Compared to waitlist (WL; n = 29; 58% female), CBT (n = 24; 
52% female) led to significantly lower levels of fixed beliefs about anxiety (Mbaseline = 11.70 
vs. MPost = 7.08, d = 1.27). These implicit beliefs indirectly explained CBT-related changes 
in social anxiety symptoms (κ2 = .28, [95% CI = .12, .46]). Implicit beliefs also uniquely 
predicted treatment outcomes when controlling for baseline social anxiety and other kinds of 
maladaptive beliefs (perceived social costs, perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive 
interpersonal beliefs). Finally, implicit beliefs continued to predict social anxiety symptoms 
at 12 months post-treatment. These findings suggest that changes in patients’ beliefs about 
their emotions may play an important role in CBT for SAD.  
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Introduction 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common condition affecting approximately 15 
million Americans at any one time (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005), with a lifetime 
prevalence of up to 12.1% (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). It is a 
chronic and disabling disorder, with symptoms typically developing at an early age and 
following a chronic, unremitting course (Reich, Goldenberg, Vasile, Goisman, & Keller, 
1994). SAD can interfere noticeably with daily life, often leading to avoidance behaviours, 
stress, and impairments in work (Bruch, Fallon, & Heimberg, 2003), school (Kashdan & 
Herbert, 2001; Schneier et al., 1994), friendships, and intimate relationships (Montesi et al., 
2012; Rodebaugh, 2009).  
One of the most common treatments for SAD is cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) (Wong, Gordon, & Heimberg, 2012). CBT for social anxiety works by altering 
patients’ dysfunctional beliefs through cognitive restructuring and systematic exposure to 
feared stimuli. Research indicates that CBT is an efficacious treatment for SAD (Ledley et 
al., 2009), more so than interpersonal psychotherapy (Stangier, Schramm, Heidenreich, 
Berger, & Clark, 2011), psychodynamic therapy (Leichsenring et al., 2013), exposure and 
relaxation training (Clark et al., 2006), or treatments combining medication with either self-
exposure (Clark et al., 2003) or emotional support (Mortberg, Clark, Sundin, & Aberg 
Wistedt, 2007). There is also evidence that CBT results in sustained long-term 
improvements in SAD (Heimberg, Salzman, Holt, & Blendell, 1993; Mortberg, Clark, & 
Bejerot, 2011). However, despite clear evidence for the efficacy of CBT, many SAD 
patients still fail to respond to treatment (Brozovich & Heimberg, 2011), and research is still 
needed on the mechanisms underlying CBT-based interventions (Hofmann, 2000).  
Cognitive Variables in Social Anxiety Disorder 
Cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 
2010; Hofmann, 2007) outline a number of cognitive distortions and dysfunctional beliefs in 
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the disorder’s etiology and maintenance. In a destructive cycle, these cognitive factors are 
believed to lead to exaggerated emotional reactivity, dysregulation, safety and avoidance 
behaviour all of which further perpetuate social anxiety symptoms (Clark, 2001; Clark & 
Wells, 1995). Hofmann’s (2000, 2007) model of SAD, for example, presents several 
maladaptive beliefs that may contribute to the disorder’s maintenance. Broadly divided into 
three categories, these beliefs include: 1) beliefs about social situations – including 
unrealistic goals and expectations for social performance, poor social self-efficacy, and 
dysfunctional beliefs about the probability and cost of behaving poorly; 2) beliefs about the 
self – including negative self-perception, rumination, and heightened self-focused attention; 
and 3) beliefs about emotions – including the belief that one has little control over one’s 
emotions.  
Given the putative importance of cognitive variables in SAD, there is growing 
interest in the role they may play in treatment. For example, researchers have examined 
maladaptive beliefs about social situations, including beliefs about the probability of a 
negative social events occurring (e.g., that you will be ignored by someone you know), and 
the cost of these events (e.g. how bad or distressing it would be if this were to happen) (see 
Smits, Julian, Rosenfield, & Powers, 2012 for a review); as well as the role of perceived 
social self-efficacy (e.g., the belief that you are capable of avoiding negative evaluation in 
social situations (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2003; Hofmann, 2000, 2007; Leary & Atherton, 
1986). There has also been some work on the role of maladaptive self-beliefs in treatment 
for SAD, for example, negative beliefs about one’s appearance and performance (e.g., that 
one is unattractive or perceived as ‘boring’) (Rapee, Gaston, & Abbott, 2009), and the role 
of negative interpersonal beliefs (e.g., the belief that one is ‘unlovable’ or ‘doesn’t fit in’) 
(Boden et al., 2012). 
Understanding changes in cognitive processes that occur during treatment is an 
important goal of clinical research (Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Hofmann, 2000). Intervening 
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variables form the basis of many psychological theories and are of particular interest in 
clinical treatments and interventions. Despite some research on maladaptive self-beliefs and 
beliefs about social situations in SAD (Boden et al., 2012; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 
1996; Hofmann, 2004; Rapee et al., 2009), to date, there has been very little work on 
people’s beliefs about their emotions. This is unfortunate; because there is good reason to 
believe emotion beliefs may have clinical significance (Hofmann, 2000, 2005, 2007; Tamir 
& Mauss, 2011). The current study was designed to address this gap in the literature by 
examining beliefs about emotions in SAD and their potential role as a mechanism of change 
treatment. In the next section, we consider the literature on beliefs about emotions. 
Implicit Beliefs about Emotions 
Research in non-clinical samples has found that most people hold beliefs about the 
fixed or malleable nature of emotions (De Castella et al., 2013; Tamir, John, Srivastava, & 
Gross, 2007). People holding entity beliefs about emotions more readily agree, “people can’t 
really change the emotions they have.” People holding incremental beliefs, on the other 
hand, view emotions as malleable and believe that “everyone can learn to control their 
emotions.” Because these beliefs are not always consciously held, they are referred to as 
implicit beliefs or implicit theories (see Dweck, 1999 for a review). Implicit theories, 
however, are traditionally measured using self-report scales and are therefore distinct from 
measures designed to assess implicit or automatic associations for example, as with the 
implicit-association-test or IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Implicit theories 
also reflect broad beliefs about one’s capacity for change, and in this way differ from self-
efficacy beliefs, which typically assess perceived competences, and “operative capabilities 
as of now,” rather than potential capabilities or expected future capabilities (Bandura, 1997 
p.44). In the context of social anxiety, recent work examining beliefs about emotions found 
that SAD patients were more likely than healthy individuals to believe that their emotions 
and anxiety could not be changed or controlled (De Castella et al., 2014). Entity beliefs 
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about emotions also predicted more severe stress and anxiety, lower self-esteem, and poorer 
overall satisfaction with life. Importantly, SAD patients’ beliefs about anxiety were also a 
stronger predictor of these outcomes than their general beliefs about emotions. In this study, 
we hoped to examine whether emotion beliefs also serve as an intervening variable in CBT. 
The Current Study 
The aim of the current study was to examine the role of emotion beliefs as a 
mechanism of change in CBT for social anxiety disorder. We chose to focus on beliefs 
about anxiety, as these beliefs may be more strongly associated with clinical outcomes than 
general beliefs about emotion in patients with SAD (De Castella et al., 2014). In the context 
of a randomized controlled trial of CBT for SAD, we hypothesized that (H1) compared to 
waitlist (WL) participants, patients receiving CBT would show a significant reduction in 
entity beliefs about anxiety. We also hypothesized that (H2) CBT would lead to reductions 
in social anxiety via patient’s implicit beliefs about their emotions. 
In addition to these two hypotheses, we wanted to examine the specificity of changes 
in emotion beliefs and their stability over time. We predicted that (H3) emotion beliefs 
would explain unique variance in post-treatment social anxiety beyond that accounted for by 
patients’ baseline social anxiety levels or by alternative belief measures (e.g., beliefs about 
social costs; perceived social self-efficacy; maladaptive interpersonal beliefs). Finally, we 
predicted that (H4) changes in implicit beliefs during CBT would predict social anxiety at 1-
year follow-up.  
Method 
Study Design 
Participants were recruited from 2007 to 2010 as part of a larger study on CBT and 
the neural substrates of emotion regulation in generalized SAD. The overall design of the 
study and its main outcomes, including adherence to CONSORT guidelines, have been 
reported elsewhere (Boden et al., 2012; Goldin et al., 2012).  
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Participants and Procedure 
Participants were 53 patients (24 men, 29 women) who completed CBT or WL in a 
randomized clinical control trial of CBT for social anxiety. All patients met DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for a primary diagnosis of generalized 
SAD as assessed by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for the DSM-IV-Lifetime 
version (ADIS-IV-L, Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994). Patients were between 21 and 53 
years of age (M = 34yrs, SD = 9.3yrs), and were ethnically heterogeneous (62% White; 19% 
Asian; 9% Hispanic; 4% Filipino, 2% Pacific Islander; 4% Other). All patients underwent 
extensive diagnostic screening, including telephone and in-person diagnostic interviews by 
clinical psychologists. Patients were ineligible if they were receiving concurrent 
psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy and were excluded for comorbid psychiatric disorders 
other than secondary diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder, specific phobia, panic 
disorder, or dysthymia. After being admitted to the study, participants completed a series of 
online questionnaires. Patients were then randomized to 16 weekly sessions of individual 
CBT for SAD (n = 24) or a 16-week WL group (n = 29). During the 16 sessions of CBT, 
SAD patients completed assessments of anxiety and emotion regulation (Goldin et al., 2012) 
as well as a battery of assessments pre- and post-treatment and at 1-year post-CBT.  
Measures 
Implicit Beliefs about Social Anxiety 
Beliefs about the malleability of anxiety were assessed using the 4-item Implicit 
Beliefs About Social Anxiety Scale (De Castella et al., 2014). Based on traditional implicit 
theories of emotion measures (De Castella et al., 2013; Tamir et al., 2007), the IBSA 
contains two items assessing incremental beliefs: “If I want to, I can change the social 
anxiety that I have,” “I can learn to control my social anxiety,” and two items measuring 
entity beliefs: “The truth is, I have very little control over my social anxiety,” “No matter 
how hard I try, I can’t really change the social anxiety that I have.” Patients were asked to 
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rate their agreement with each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Incremental belief items 
were reverse-scored and all items were summed, so that higher scores reflect greater entity 
beliefs and lower scores greater incremental beliefs about anxiety. Research with the IBSA 
indicates the scale displays high internal consistency in both non-clinical subjects (NC) and 
patients with SAD (NC α = .81, SAD α = .92). Moreover, the IBSA displays good 
convergent and discriminant validity, predicting stress and anxiety, self-esteem, and 
negative affect in patients with SAD (De Castella et al., 2014). All scale ranges and 
reliabilities at baseline and post-CBT are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  
Social Anxiety  
Severity of social anxiety was assessed with the self-report version of the Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS-SR, Fresco et al., 2001). The LSAS-SR is a commonly used, 
reliable, and valid measure of social anxiety (Ledley, Erwin, Morrison, & Heimberg, 2013). 
The scale consists of 24 items, which independently assess fear and avoidance of social 
(e.g., meeting strangers) and performance (e.g., taking a written test) situations during the 
past week. Participants rate their fear and avoidance on a scale from 0 (no fear/avoidance) 
to 3 (severe fear or anxiety/ usually avoid). Total scores range from 0 to 144.  
Other Beliefs in SAD 
 To examine the specificity of emotion beliefs (H2), we included three additional 
measures based on existing research with SAD patients:  
(1) The Social Costs Questionnaire (SCQ, Foa et al., 1996) which measures 
perceived costs associated with social events by asking patients to rate 40 negative 
hypothetical situations (e.g., “How bad would it be to unexpectedly be called in to see your 
supervisor at work?”). Responses are recorded on a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (not at 
all bad) to 8 (extremely bad).  
(2) The Perceived Social Self-Efficacy Scale (PSSE, Smith & Betz, 2000) which 
assesses confidence in one’s abilities to engage in social interaction tasks necessary for 
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initiating and maintaining interpersonal relationships. The scale consists of 12 items (e.g., 
“How confident are you that you can mingle with others at a party or other social function.”) 
Responses are recorded on a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (cannot do at all) to 10 
(certain can do).  
(3) The Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs Scale (MIBS, Boden et al., 2012) 
measures endorsement of nine negative self-beliefs relevant to SAD (e.g. “If people could 
see who I really am, they would reject me”). Responses are rated on a Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (Definitely false or Strongly disagree) to 5 (Definitely true or Strongly 
agree).  
Treatment  
Patients receiving CBT completed 16 individual sessions with a trained clinical 
psychologist. Sessions were 1hr, except for the first in-session exposure session, which 
lasted 1.5hrs. CBT was delivered using a manualized treatment protocol which included a 
therapist guide (Hope, Heimberg, & Turk, 2006) and a client workbook (Hope, Heimberg, 
Juster, & Turk, 2000) and featured training in cognitive restructuring techniques for 
identifying and modifying negative self-beliefs. CBT sessions also involved psycho-
education and graded exposure to anxiety-provoking situations both within session and as 
homework. All sessions were recorded and coded for adherence by trained researchers 
according to the Therapist Adherence Scale (Hope, VanDyke, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 
2001). There was no significant difference between therapists on the adherence ratings (M = 
4.16, SD = 0.24, F(3,33) = 0.11, p =.96).  
Statistical Analyses 
To evaluate the effects of CBT on patients’ implicit beliefs (H1), a 2 group (CBT vs. 
WL) x 2 Time (baseline vs. post-treatment/WL) repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted followed by paired-sample t-tests for the CBT and WL groups. 
Next, to test the potential intervening role of implicit beliefs (H2), while accounting for 
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baseline social anxiety, we first computed orthogonalized, residual gains scores for the 
LSAS-SR using pre-post output residuals. Orthogonalized scores represent a measure of 
change during treatment that is independent of pre-treatment status. Using orthogonalized 
scores we were able to account for baseline social anxiety in all analyses, and control for 
baseline correlations between the LSAS-SR and the other belief measures. Because 
orthogonalized scores are uncorrelated with baseline severity, these scores also represent a 
more conservative estimate of change following treatment (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 
2003). We then examined the effect of CBT vs. WL (the predictor) on the LSAS-SR 
residuals (the dependent variable) via patients’ implicit beliefs (the intermediary). This 
indirect effect is quantified as the product of the coefficients, a and b. The direct effect, c’, 
was also estimated but is not relevant when testing mediation or indirect effects (Hayes, 
2009) 1 This product term (ab) was tested for significance using the Preacher and Hayes 
(2008; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011) PROCESS macro for SPSS. Unlike other 
traditional tests of mediation and indirect effects, such as the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and 
those presented by Baron and Kenny (1986), the bootstrap method does not assume standard 
errors are normally distributed, and does not compromise statistical power with multiple 
tests. The bootstrap method is also the preferred approach for small-to-medium samples 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). We computed bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals based 
on a bootstrap of 5000 samples. Gender, age and ethnicity were not associated with implicit 
beliefs or either of the dependent variables and were not included as covariates.  
Indirect effect analyses were repeated – and measures of effect size calculated – for 
each of the alternative belief measures (social costs, perceived social self efficacy, and 
maladaptive interpersonal beliefs). To evaluate the size of the indirect effects, Preacher and 
1 The Baron and Kenny (1986) causal steps approach to mediation requires that the effects of X on Y (path c), 
X on M (path a), and M on Y (path b) are significant, as well as that the effect of X on Y controlling for M 
(path c’) is smaller than c by a non-trivial amount. However, mediation effects may still be observed in the 
absence of a significant total effect (path c) and/or a direct effect (path c’).  
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Kelly (2011) suggest the use of Kappa Squared (κ2) – a ratio of the indirect effect to the 
maximum possible effect permitted by the design and data. In the current study all waitlist 
subjects were offered treatment at the completion of the 12-week waitlist period. For this 
reason, a treatment vs. waitlist-control comparison can only be made at two time points: 
baseline and post-treatment. We therefore examine the indirect effect of emotion beliefs and 
their role as a potential intervening variable rather than as a mediator of change in treatment. 
Results are reported as standardized coefficients.  
To examine whether the patients’ implicit beliefs predicted unique variance in 
treatment outcomes – beyond what might already be explained by their baseline social 
anxiety level, or by the alternative belief measures (H3) – we conducted two-step 
hierarchical regression analyses on the LSAS-SR residual scores. Post-treatment scores for 
perceived social costs (SCQ), perceived social self-efficacy (PSSE), and maladaptive 
interpersonal beliefs (MIBS) – were entered in the first step, followed by post-treatment 
implicit beliefs about social anxiety (IBSA) in the second step. Finally, to test whether CBT 
led to lasting changes in patients’ implicit beliefs and symptoms (H4), we conducted follow-
up assessments with subjects in the CBT group (n = 18) at 12-months. Changes in implicit 
beliefs were assessed using paired-sample t-tests and by examining the Pearson product-
moment correlation between scores at the two time points. To examine whether implicit 
beliefs predicted social anxiety at follow-up, we again conducted two-step hierarchical 
regression analyses on 12-month LSAS-SR residual scores, which controlled for baseline 
social anxiety. Post-treatment scores on the alternative belief measures (SCQ, PSSE and 
MIBS) were entered in the first step, followed by post-treatment implicit beliefs in the 
second step.  
Results 
Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for missing values and distributional 
assumptions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). At baseline, there were no significant differences 
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between groups in age, gender, ethnicity, income, marital status, education, current or past 
Axis I comorbidity, or prior experience with medication or psychotherapy. There was also 
no significant difference at baseline between groups on patients’ implicit beliefs about 
anxiety (MCBT = 11.71, SD = 3.78 vs. MWL = 11.97, SD = 4.00), t(51) = -0.24, p = .81. 
Implicit Beliefs and CBT for Social Anxiety  
Normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance were all found to be satisfactory. 
Missing data were rare (less than 5% on any variable) and were imputed with the overall 
mean for that variable – a conservative technique in such cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Consistent with H1, the repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant treatment x time 
interaction, F(1, 51) = 30.03, p < .001, R2 = .37.  Follow-up planned paired t-tests showed 
that, compared to baseline, patients reported lower fixed entity beliefs about their anxiety 
post-CBT (Mbaseline = 11.70, SD = 3.78, MPost = 7.08, SD = 3.49; t(23) = 6.18, p < .001). This 
was a large effect by Cohen’s (1988) standards, d = 1.27. There was, however, no 
significant difference over time for WL patients (Mbaseline = 11.97, SD = 4.00 vs. MPost = 
12.34, SD = 3.43, d = 0.10), t(28) = -0.69, p = .50 (see Figure 1).  
The Indirect Effect of Implicit Beliefs   
In H2, we predicted that patients’ implicit beliefs about their emotions would 
indirectly explain CBT-related changes in social anxiety. As predicted, the indirect effect for 
implicit beliefs was significant with confidence intervals excluding zero, (ab = 12.87, 95% 
CI = [5.21, 24.00], κ2 = .28 [95% CI = .12, .46]). This was a large effect by Preacher and 
Kelly’s (2011) standards (see Figure 2).  To compare the indirect effect of implicit beliefs 
with other intervening variables, we conducted additional analyses of indirect effects for 
perceived social costs (SCQ), perceived social self-efficacy beliefs (PSSE), and maladaptive 
interpersonal beliefs (MIBS). There were no significant indirect effects for perceived social 
costs (SCQ, ab = .38, 95% CI = [-3.07, 4.89], κ2 = .13 [95% CI = .00, .04]) or for perceived 
social self-efficacy beliefs (SSE, ab = 5.04, 95% CI = [-.25, 14.20], κ2 = .13 [95% CI = .01, 
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.32]). However, the indirect effect for maladaptive interpersonal beliefs (MIBS) was 
significant with confidence intervals excluding zero, (ab = 10.26, 95% CI = [3.85, 20.29], 
κ2 = .26 [95% CI = .11, .43]). This was also a large effect by Preacher and Kelly’s (2011) 
standards. 
Implicit Beliefs and Other Belief Measures  
In H3, we predicted that implicit beliefs would explain unique variance in post-
treatment social anxiety while accounting for baseline social anxiety and for the independent 
contribution of the other belief measures – perceived social costs (SCQ), perceived social 
self-efficacy (PSSE), and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs (MIBS). As predicted, implicit 
beliefs explained unique variance in social anxiety, above and beyond that explained by 
baseline social anxiety, the SCQ, PSSE, and MIBS. Table 3 displays the standardized 
regression coefficients (β), R2, and R2-change for this analysis. 
Implicit Beliefs about Anxiety at Follow-up 
In our final analysis, we examined whether CBT led to lasting changes in patients’ 
implicit beliefs, and if so, whether implicit beliefs would continue to predict anxiety 
outcomes at 12 months (H4). Of the original 24 subjects in the CBT group, 18 completed 
the follow-up assessment. From treatment-completion to 12-month follow-up, patients’ 
implicit beliefs about anxiety were strongly correlated, with no significant differences 
between the two time points, r = .91, p < .001, (Mpost = 6.44, SD = 3.22 vs. M12m = 6.28, SD 
= 4.31; t(17) = 0.36, p = .71). Results of hierarchical linear regressions revealed that post-
treatment implicit beliefs and the alternative cognitive variables (SCQ, PSSE, and MIBS) 
together accounted for 29% of the variance in LSAS-SR residuals at 12 months (R2 = .41, R2 
adjusted = .29, F(4,19) = 3.31, p < .05). Consistent with H4, implicit beliefs explained unique 
variance in social anxiety, above and beyond that explained by the alternative belief 
measures (b = 2.4, t(19) = 2.06, p < .05, R2 change = .13). These findings indicate that CBT-
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related changes in implicit beliefs persisted and continued to predict symptom severity 12 
months after treatment completion.   
Discussion 
The primary aim of the current study was to examine whether patients’ implicit 
beliefs about their ability to control their emotions predict CBT outcomes for patients with 
SAD. Cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 
2014; Hofmann, 2007) have emphasized the role of maladaptive beliefs and dysfunctional 
cognitive content – particularly dysfunctional beliefs about social situations, and 
dysfunctional beliefs about the self. To date, however, there has been very little emphasis on 
patients’ beliefs about their emotions, and no studies have examined the role of emotion 
beliefs in CBT for SAD. 
Implicit beliefs and social anxiety were assessed at baseline and at the completion of 
a 16-week randomized controlled trial of CBT for SAD. As predicted, patients receiving 
CBT (compared to waitlist controls) were less likely to hold fixed entity beliefs about their 
anxiety post-treatment/WL, and this shift in thinking explained treatment-related reductions 
in social anxiety. Additional analyses revealed that patients’ implicit beliefs also uniquely 
predicted how much they benefited from treatment, even when controlling for baseline 
social anxiety and other categories of beliefs. Finally, implicit beliefs continued to predict 
anxiety symptoms at 12-month follow-up, uniquely explaining 13% of the variance in 
symptoms.  
Emotion Beliefs and CBT for Social Anxiety 
The current results suggest that implicit beliefs about emotions may play an 
important role in CBT. CBT for SAD teaches patients the skills required to confront 
anxiety-provoking situations and to examine the core beliefs that underlie their fears and 
avoidance behaviour (Heimberg et al., 2010; Hofmann, 2007). Patients learn about various 
cognitive distortions, attention and memory biases; are taught skills for managing and 
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reducing their anxiety (Ledley et al., 2013); and are empowered to use these skills through 
graded exposure. In working with fear and avoidance hierarchies through treatment, patients 
are also provided with direct evidence that their self-reported fear and anxiety levels do 
change. In this way, patients in CBT may come to experience and internalize greater belief 
in their ability to change and control their emotions, even if this message is not explicitly 
emphasized as in interventions based on implicit theories of self (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, 
& Dweck, 2007; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003).  
The Role of Emotion Beliefs in Treatment 
There are a number of explanations for why patients’ beliefs about their emotions 
may play an important role in treatment. First, Hofmann and Barlow (2002) suggest that for 
patients with social anxiety, it may actually be the perceived lack of control over one’s 
emotional response – independent of judgment biases and fears of negative evaluation – that 
triggers fear and avoidance of social situations. This helps explain the prevalence of panic 
attacks among patients with SAD (Kessler et al., 2006) and why many attribute their fears 
more to panic attacks than traumatic events or indirect conditioning (Hofmann, Ehlers, & 
Roth, 1995). In this way, if patients come to believe they have greater control over their 
emotions, reductions in fear and avoidance behaviour may follow.  
Second, incremental beliefs about emotions may be a necessary prerequisite for 
many adaptive forms of emotion regulation. Tamir and Mauss (2011), for example, argue 
that before people initiate attempts to regulate their emotions, they must first believe that 
emotions can, in principle, be controlled, and they must then believe that they personally 
can control them. Research indicates that patients with SAD typically use maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategies in day-to-day life, such as situational avoidance and emotional 
suppression (Werner, Goldin, Ball, Heimberg, & Gross, 2011). These strategies make sense 
as preventing or hiding one’s emotional reactions may be perceived as the only option if 
patients hold fixed entity beliefs about their emotions. In non-clinical samples, entity beliefs 
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about emotions have also been linked with reduced likelihood of using adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal (De Castella et al., 2013; Tamir et al., 2007). 
If CBT leads to a reliable shift in patients’ beliefs about their emotions, this may, in turn, 
promote use of more adaptive emotion regulation strategies. Given that many features of 
psychopathology involve poorly implemented, inflexible or context-insensitive strategies 
(Werner & Gross, 2009), examining how implicit beliefs influence emotion regulation 
choice is an important area for future research.   
Third, patients’ beliefs about whether they can learn to control their emotions may 
play a key role in their commitment to and engagement with psychotherapy. Positive 
expectations for change in treatment are regarded as one of the most important nonspecific 
factors in predicting general treatment response (Arnkoff, Glass, & Shapiro, 2002). Positive 
expectations for change also predict rate of change (Price & Anderson, 2011), and treatment 
outcomes (Chambless, Tran, & Glass, 1997) for patients with SAD. Not surprisingly, these 
findings have led to renewed interest in motivational interviewing (MI, Miller & Rollnick, 
2002), and its manualized variant, motivational enhancement therapy (MET, Miller, 
Zweben, DiClemente, & Rychtarik, 1992). Research indicates MI and MET techniques are 
effective additions to CBT for generalized anxiety (Westra, Arkowitz, & Dozois, 2009), and 
there is some support for their efficacy with SAD patients (Buckner & Schmidt, 2009). MI 
approaches, however, do not explicitly focus on patients’ beliefs about their emotions or the 
efficacy of treatments for managing one’s anxiety. If treatment ambivalence is due in part to 
patients’ implicit beliefs about their emotions, focusing on implicit beliefs in treatment, or 
as part of an orientation to treatment, may prove beneficial for improving MI and MET 
interventions.   
Finally, before even finding their way to clinical professionals, emotion beliefs may 
influence patients’ help-seeking behaviour and their openness to various forms of treatment. 
SAD is frequently misdiagnosed and under-treated, with patients often waiting more than 
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nine years before finding appropriate specialist care (Wagner, Silove, Marnane, & Rouen, 
2006). If patients with SAD hold entity beliefs about their anxiety – as something that is 
fixed and uncontrollable rather than malleable and treatable – they may fail to seek 
treatment. When patients do seek help, emotion beliefs may also influence treatment 
preferences, with patients holding entity beliefs more readily turning to medication and 
symptom management over active cognitive change strategies taught in therapies like CBT. 
To date, there is limited work in this area, and research examining links between emotion 
beliefs, help-seeking, and treatment preferences is needed.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the current study makes important contributions to research on implicit 
theories and social anxiety, several limitations should be noted. The first relates to 
measurement. As with much of the research on implicit theories (see Dweck, 1999), this 
study is based largely on participant self-reports. Self-report data provide valuable insights 
into patients’ beliefs and their anxiety, and using self-reports has long been the primary 
approach for examining implicit theories. However, self-report methods – particularly for 
psychological symptoms – are not always as objective as other methods, such as 
independent evaluations, psychophysiological assessments, and behavioural tasks. In the 
future it will, therefore, be important to incorporate non-self-report measures to further 
replicate, and extend our findings.   
A second limitation relates to the potential intervening role of cognitive variables in 
treatment. In the current study we examined several cognitive variables that might explain 
treatment outcomes in CBT for SAD. These variables included: implicit beliefs about 
emotion, perceived social costs, perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive 
interpersonal beliefs. By controlling for pre-treatment social anxiety, we were also able to 
examine the unique role of cognitive variables in treatment separate from patients’ pre-
existing levels of anxiety. We found significant indirect effects for implicit beliefs and 
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maladaptive interpersonal beliefs. Indirect effects however, are not evidence of causation, 
and they do not rule out the possibility of other additional intervening variables. Researchers 
for example, have also examined the potential mediating role of emotion regulation 
strategies (Goldin et al., 2012), negative self-talk (Kendall & Treadwell, 2007), as well as 
attention, memory and information processing biases relevant to fear and anxiety (Hofmann, 
Moscovitch, Kim, & Taylor, 2004; Mansell & Clark, 1999). It will therefore be important in 
future research to directly examine the relative strength of these and other candidate 
variables, and their role in treatment. By incorporating experimental manipulations; clinical 
interventions; and/or multiple assessments throughout treatment, future studies may also be 
able to better clarify whether cognitive variables play a causal role in treatment. 
A final limitation relates to generalizability. Patients in the current study were 
carefully screened and motivated to undertake treatment. They also completed multiple 
interviews and assessments that were part of the research programme. Given that many 
patients fail to even seek treatment (especially patients with SAD), it is entirely likely that 
entity beliefs about emotions are even more prevalent among non-treatment-seekers in the 
general population. Furthermore, from the current study should also only be generalized to 
CBT for SAD. It remains to be seen whether implicit beliefs about emotions explain 
treatment-related gains in other disorders, and in other forms of psychotherapy, or whether 
findings reported in the current study are unique to CBT for SAD alone.  
In sum, this randomized controlled trial provides evidence for the role of implicit 
beliefs in cognitive-behavioral therapy for SAD. While there has been growing research on 
the role of cognitive variables in treatment for SAD, to date, there is limited research on 
patients’ beliefs about their emotions. We found that CBT led to a reliable long-term change 
in patients’ implicit beliefs. Implicit beliefs, in turn, explained treatment related reductions 
in social anxiety and accounted for unique variance in symptoms over and above that 
explained by baseline anxiety and alternative cognitive variables – perceived social costs, 
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perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs. These findings indicate 
that maladaptive beliefs – particularly about the self and about one’s emotions – may be 
important mediating variables in CBT for SAD. Implicit beliefs about emotions appear to be 
a fruitful area for future research and may come to play an important role in 
conceptualizations of the etiology and treatment of social anxiety.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Study Variables at Baseline (n =53). 
     Correlations 




α 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Entity Beliefs about Anxiety (IBSA) 11.85 3.87 4 – 20 .78 1 .28* .23 -.17 .39** 
2. Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) 82.76 19.36 0 – 144 .92  1 .28* -.48*** .46*** 
3. Social Costs (SCQ) 205.4 47.08 0 – 320 .96   1 -.35** .35** 
4. Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) 50.85 20.33 0 – 120 .90    1 -.52*** 
5. Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 30.36   5.54 9 – 45 .85     1 
 
Note:  IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about Social Anxiety Scale; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self Report. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables Post-Treatment for CBT patients (n = 24). 
     Correlations 




α 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Entity Beliefs about Anxiety (IBSA) 7.08 3.49 4 – 20 .75 1 .54** -.13 -.36 .37 
2. Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) 50.50 19.97 0 – 144 .91  1 .10 -.70** .67* 
3. Social Costs (SCQ) 187.08 40.66 0 – 320 .97   1 -.39* .32 
4. Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) 69.70 20.89 0 – 120 .90    1 -.77** 
5. Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 23.00 6.93 9 – 45 .85     1 
 
Note:  IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about Social Anxiety Scale; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self Report. 
*p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Table 3. Hierarchical Regression Predicting Post-Treatment Variance in Social Anxiety (LSAS-
SR) accounting for Baseline Anxiety and Alternative Belief Measures (n = 53). 
 




Step 1  






1. Social Costs (SCQ) .01 .05 .01    
2. Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) -.14 .15 -.15    
3. Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 1.5 * .41 .57*    
 
Step 2 






1. Social Costs (SCQ) .02 .05 .06    
2. Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) -.06 .15 -.07     
3. Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 1.19** .41 .45**    
4. Entity Beliefs about Anxiety (IBSA) 1.37* .59 .29*    
 
Note:  LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self Report; IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about 
Social Anxiety Scale. Adjusted R2 values and increments for R2 change are based upon F tests for 
that step. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Figure 1. Implicit beliefs about anxiety for patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD) at baseline 
and post-treatment.  
 
Note: At baseline patients in CBT and WL groups did not differ in their implicit beliefs about 
anxiety. Post-treatment entity beliefs about anxiety declined for patients receiving CBT (n = 24) but 
not for waitlist patients (n=29). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.   
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Figure 2. The indirect effect of patients’ implicit beliefs about anxiety on post-CBT social 
anxiety, while controlling for baseline social anxiety symptoms. 





The regression coefficient for the effect of 
treatment decreases when controlling for implicit beliefs about anxiety. Values are standardized 
regression coefficients. a LSAS-SR residuals represent post-CBT social anxiety (LSAS-SR) 
controlling for baseline social anxiety  b When controlling for implicit beliefs about anxiety, the 
association between treatment and social anxiety is no longer significant . IBSA = Implicit Beliefs 





Post-CBT Entity Beliefs about Anxiety (IBSA) .57** b  -.61*** c  (c’) 
-.41** (-.10) b 
Post-CBT social anxiety  (LSAS-SR) a CBT vs.  Waitlist 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   25 
References 
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(DSM-IV) (4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Arnkoff, D. B., Glass, C. R., & Shapiro, D. A. (2002). Expectations and preferences. In J. C. 
Norcross (Ed.), Psychotherapy relationships that work (pp. 335-356). Oxford: University 
Press. 
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman & 
Company. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-1182. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51 
Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit theories of intelligence 
predict achievement across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an 
intervention. Child Development, 78, 246-263. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.00995.x 
Boden, M. T., John, O. P., Goldin, P. R., Werner, K., Heimberg, R. G., & Gross, J. J. (2012). The 
role of maladaptive beliefs in cognitive-behavioral therapy: Evidence from social anxiety 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 50, 287-291. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2012.02.007 
Brown, T. A., DiNardo, P., & Barlow, D. H. (1994). Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule 
Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV-L). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Brozovich, F. A., & Heimberg, R. G. (2011). A treatment refractory case of social anxiety 
disorder: Lessons learned from a failed course of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Cognitive 
and Behavioral Practice, 18, 316-325. doi: 10.1016/j.cbpra.2010.07.003  
Bruch, M. A., Fallon, M., & Heimberg, R. G. (2003). Social phobia and difficulties in 
occupational adjustment. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 50, 109-117. doi: 
10.1037/0022-0167.50.1.109 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   26 
Buckner, J. D., & Schmidt, N. B. (2009). A randomized pilot study of motivation enhancement 
therapy to increase utilization of cognitive-behavioral therapy for social anxiety. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47, 710-715. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2009.04.009 
Chambless, D. L., Tran, G. Q., & Glass, C. R. (1997). Predictors of response to cognitive-
behavioral group therapy for social phobia. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11, 221-240. 
doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(97)00008-X 
Clark, D. M. (2001). A cognitive perspective on social phobia. In W. R. Crozier & L. E. Alden 
(Eds.), International handbook of social anxiety: Concepts, research and interventions 
relating to the self and shyness. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Clark, D. M., Ehlers, A., Hackmann, A., McManus, F., Fennell, M., Grey, N., . . . Wild, J. 
(2006). Cognitive therapy versus exposure and applied relaxation in social phobia: A 
randomized controlled trial. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 74, 568-578. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.74.3.568 
Clark, D. M., Ehlers, A., McManus, F., Hackmann, A., Fennell, M., Campbell, H., . . . Louis, B. 
(2003). Cognitive therapy versus fluoxetine in generalized social phobia: a randomized 
placebo-controlled trial. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71, 1058-1067. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.71.6.1058 
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. G. Heimberg, M. R. 
Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment 
and treatment (pp. 69-93). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Hillsdale, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple regression/correlation 
analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   27 
De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Dweck, C. S., & Gross, J. J. (2013). Beliefs 
about emotion: Links to emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress. Basic 
and Applied Social Psychology, 35, 497-505. doi: 10.1080/01973533.2013.840632 
De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Heimberg, R. G., & Gross, J. J. (2014). 
Emotion beliefs in social anxiety disorder: Associations with stress, anxiety, and well-
being. Australian Journal of Psychology, 66, 130-148. doi: 10.1111/ajpy.12053 
Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development. 
Philadelphia: Psychology Press. 
Foa, E. B., Franklin, M. E., Perry, K. J., & Herbert, J. D. (1996). Cognitive biases in generalized 
social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 433-439. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.105.3.433 
Fresco, D. M., Coles, M. E., Heimberg, R. G., Liebowitz, M. R., Hami, S., Stein, M. B., & 
Goetz, D. (2001). The Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale: A comparison of the 
psychometric properties of self-report and clinician-administered formants. Psychological 
Medicine, 31, 1025-1035. doi: 10.1017\S003329170105405 
Gaudiano, B. A., & Herbert, J. D. (2003). Preliminary psychometric evaluation of a new self-
efficacy scale and its relationship to treatment outcome in social anxiety disorder. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 537-555. doi: 10.1023/A:1026355004548 
Goldin, P. R., Ziv, M., Jazaieri, H., Werner, K., Kraemer, H., Heimberg, R. G., & Gross, J. J. 
(2012). Cognitive reappraisal self-efficacy mediates the effects of individual cognitive-
behavioral therapy for social anxiety disorder. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 80, 1034-1040. doi: 10.1037/a0028555 
Good, C., Aronson, J., & Inzlicht, M. (2003). Improving adolescents' standardized test 
performance: An intervention to reduce the effects of stereotype threat. Journal of 
Applied Developmental Psychology, 24, 645-662. doi: 10.1016/j.appdev.2003.09.002. 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   28 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. doi: 10.1177/0146167205275613 
Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new 
millennium. Communication Monographs, 76(4), 408-420. doi: 
10.1080/03637750903310360. 
Heimberg, R. G., Brozovich, F. A., & Rapee, R. M. (2010). A cognitive-behavioral model of 
social anxiety disorder: Update and extension (2nd edition, pp.395-422). Social anxiety: 
Clinical, developmental, and social perspectives. New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Heimberg, R. G., Brozovich, F. A., & Rapee, R. M. (2014). A cognitive-behavioral model of 
social anxiety disorder. In S. G. Hofmann & P. M. DiBartolo (Eds.), Social Anxiety: 
Clinical, developmental, and social perspectives (3rd edition ed., pp. 705-728). Waltham, 
MA: Academic Press. 
Heimberg, R. G., Salzman, D. G., Holt, C. S., & Blendell, K. A. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral 
group treatment for social phobia: Effectiveness at five-year follow-up. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 17, 325-339. doi: 10.1007/BF01177658 
Hertel, P. T., & Mathews, A. (2011). Cognitive bias modification. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 6, 521 - 536. doi: 10.1177/1745691611421205 
Hofmann, S. G. (2000). Treatment of social phobia: Potential mediators and moderators. Clinical 
Psychology, 7, 3-16. doi: 10.1093/clipsy.7.1.3. 
Hofmann, S. G. (2004). Cognitive mediation of treatment change in social phobia. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72, 393-399. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.72.3.393 
Hofmann, S. G. (2005). Perception of control over anxiety mediates the relation between 
catastrophic thinking and social anxiety in social phobia. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 43, 885-895. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2004.07.002 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   29 
Hofmann, S. G. (2007). Cognitive factors that maintain social anxiety disorder: A comprehensive 
model and its treatment implications. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 36, 193-209. doi: 
10.1080/16506070701421313. 
Hofmann, S. G., & Barlow, D. H. (2002). Social phobia (social anxiety disorder). In D. H. 
Barlow (Ed.), Anxiety and its disorders: The nature and treatment of anxiety and panic 
(2nd ed., pp. 454-476). New York: Guilford Press. 
Hofmann, S. G., Ehlers, A., & Roth, W. T. (1995). Conditioning theory: A model for the 
etiology of public speaking anxiety? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 567-571. doi: 
10.1016/0005-7967(94)00072-R 
Hofmann, S. G., Moscovitch, D. A., Kim, H. J., & Taylor, A. N. (2004). Changes in self-
perception during treatment of social phobia. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 72, 588-596. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.72.4.588 
Hope, D. A., Heimberg, R. G., Juster, H., & Turk, C. L. (2000). Managing social anxiety: A 
cognitive-behaivoral therapy approach (Client Workbook). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hope, D. A., Heimberg, R. G., & Turk, C. L. (2006). Therapist guide for Managing Social 
Anxiety: A cognitive-behavioral therapy approach. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hope, D. A., VanDyke, M., Heimberg, R. G., Turk, C. L., & Fresco, D. M. (2001). Cognitive-
behavioral therapy for social anxiety disorder: Therapist adherence scale.: Available 
from Richard G. Heimberg, Adult Anxiety Clinic of Temple University, 1701 North 13th 
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122–6085. 
Kashdan, T. B., & Herbert, J. D. (2001). Social anxiety disorder in childhood and adolescence: 
Current status and future directions. Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review, 4, 37-
61. doi: 10.1023/A:1009576610507 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   30 
Kendall, P. C., & Treadwell, K. R. H. (2007). The role of self-statements as a mediator in 
treatment for youth with anxiety disorders. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 75, 380-389. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.75.3.380 
Kessler, R., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., & Walters, E. E. (2005). 
Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the national 
comorbidity survey replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 593-602. doi: 
10.1001/archpsyc.62.6.593. 
Kessler, R., Chiu, W. T., Demler, O., Merikangas, K. R., & Walters, E. E. (2005). Prevalence, 
severity, and comorbidity of 12-month DSM-IV disorders in the national comorbidity 
survey replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 617-627. doi: 
10.1001/archpsyc.62.6.617. 
Kessler, R., Chiu, W. T., Jin, R., Ruscio, A. M., Shear, K., & Walters, E. E. (2006). The 
epidemiology of panic attacks, panic disorder, and agoraphobia in the National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63, 415-424. doi: 
10.1001/archpsyc.63.4.415 
Leary, M. R., & Atherton, S. C. (1986). Self-efficacy, social anxiety, and inhibition in 
interpersonal encounters. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 4, 256-267. doi: 
10.1521/jscp.1986.4.3.256 
Ledley, D. R., Erwin, B. A., Morrison, A. S., & Heimberg, R. G. (2013). Social anxiety disorder. 
In W. E. Craighead, D. J. Miklowitz, & L. W. Craighead (Eds.), Psychopathology: 
History, theory, and empirical foundations, 2nd edition (pp. 147-192). New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Ledley, D. R., Heimberg, R. G., Hope, D. A., Hayes, S. A., Zaider, T. I., Dyke, M. V., . . . 
Fresco, D. M. (2009). Efficacy of a manualized and workbook-driven individual 
treatment for social anxiety disorder. Behavior Therapy, 40, 414-424. doi: 
10.1016/j.beth.2008.12.001 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   31 
Leichsenring, F., Salzer, S., Beutel, M. E., Herpertz, S., Hiller, W., Hoyer, J., . . . Leibing, E. 
(2013). Psychodynamic therapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy in social anxiety 
disorder: A multicenter randomized controlled trial. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
170, 759-767. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2013.12081125 
Mansell, W., & Clark, D. M. (1999). How do I appear to others? Social anxiety and processing 
of the observable self. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 419-434. doi: 
10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00148-X 
Miller, W. R., & Rollnick, S. (2002). Motivational interviewing: Preparing people for 
change (2nd edition). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Miller, W. R., Zweben, A., DiClemente, C. C., & Rychtarik, R. G. (1992). Motivational 
enhancement therapy manual: A clinical research guide for therapists treating 
individuals with alcohol abuse and dependence. Rockville, MD: National Institute on 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA). 
Montesi, J. L., Conner, B. T., Gordon, E. A., Fauber, R. L., Kim, K. H., & Heimberg, R. G. 
(2012). On the relationship among social anxiety, intimacy, sexual communication, and 
sexual satisfaction in young couples. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 42, 89-91. doi: 
10.1007/s10508-012-9929-3 
Mortberg, E., Clark, D. M., & Bejerot, S. (2011). Intensive group cognitive therapy and 
individual cognitive therapy for social phobia: Sustained improvement at 5-year follow-
up. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 25, 994-1000. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.06.007 
Mortberg, E., Clark, D. M., Sundin, O., & Aberg Wistedt, A. (2007). Intensive group cognitive 
treatment and individual cognitive therapy vs. treatment as usual in social phobia: a 
randomized controlled trial. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 115, 142-154. doi: 
10.1111/j.1600-0447.2006.00839.x 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   32 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and 
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 
40(3), 879-891. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.3.879 
Preacher, K. J., & Kelley, K. (2011). Effect size measures for mediation models: quantitative 
strategies for communicating indirect effects. Psychological Methods, 16(2), 93-115. doi: 
10.1037/a0022658 
Price, M., & Anderson, P. L. (2011). Outcome expectancy as a predictor of treatment response in 
cognitive behavioral therapy for public speaking fears within social anxiety disorder. 
Psychotherapy, 49, 1-7. doi: 10.1037/a0024734 
Rapee, R. M., Gaston, J. E., & Abbott, M. J. (2009). Testing the efficacy of theoretically derived 
improvements in the treatment of social phobia. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 77, 317-327. doi: 10.1037/a0014800 
Reich, J., Goldenberg, I., Vasile, R., Goisman, R., & Keller, M. (1994). A prospective follow-
along study of the course of social phobia. Psychiatry Research, 54, 249-258. doi: 
10.1016/0165-1781(94)90019-1 
Rodebaugh, T. L. (2009). Social phobia and perceived friendship quality. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 23, 872-878. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2009.05.001 
Rucker, D. D., Preacher, K. J., Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Mediation analysis in 
social psychology: Current practices and new recommendations. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 5(6), 359-371. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00355.x 
Schneier, F. R., Heckelman, L. R., Garfinkel, R., Campeas, R., Fallon, B. A., Gitow, A., . . . 
Liebowitz, M. R. (1994). Functional impairment in social phobia. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 55, 322-331. doi: 1995-04074-001 
Smith, H. M., & Betz, N. E. (2000). Development and validation of a scale of perceived social 
self-efficacy. Journal of Career Assessment, 8, 283-301. doi: 
10.1177/106907270000800306 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   33 
Smits, J. A. J., Julian, K., Rosenfield, D., & Powers, M. B. (2012). Threat reappraisal as a 
mediator of symptom change in cognitive-behavioral treatment of anxiety disorders: A 
systematic review. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 80, 624-635. doi: 
10.1037/a0028957 
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equation 
models. Sociological Methodology, 13, 290-312. doi: 10.2307/270723 
Stangier, U., Schramm, E., Heidenreich, T., Berger, M., & Clark, D. M. (2011). Cognitive 
therapy vs interpersonal psychotherapy in social anxiety disorder: A randomized 
controlled trial. Archives of General Psychiatry, 68, 692-700. doi: 
10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.67 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics. New Jersey: Pearson 
Education Limited. 
Tamir, M., John, O. P., Srivastava, S., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Implicit theories of emotion: 
Affective and social outcomes across a major life transition. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 92, 731-744. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.731 
Tamir, M., & Mauss, I. B. (2011). Social cognitive factors in emotion regulation: Implications 
for well-being. In I. Nyklicek, A. Vingerhoets, M. Zeelenberg, & J. Donellet (Eds.), 
Emotion regulation and well-being (pp. 31-47). New York: Springer. 
Wagner, R., Silove, D., Marnane, C., & Rouen, D. (2006). Delays in referral of patients with 
social phobia, panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder attending a specialist 
anxiety clinic. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 20, 363-371. doi: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2005.02.003 
Werner, K. H., Goldin, P. R., Ball, T. M., Heimberg, R. G., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Assessing 
emotion regulation in social anxiety disorder: The Emotion Regulation Interview. 
Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 33, 346-354. doi: 
10.1007/s10862-011-9225-x 
EMOTION BELIEFS AND CBT FOR SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER   34 
Werner, K. H., & Gross, J. J. (2009). Emotion regulation and psychopathology: A conceptual 
framework. In A. M. Kring & D. M. Sloan (Eds.), Emotion regulation and 
psychopathology: A transdiagnostic approach to etiology and treatment (pp. 13). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Westra, H. A., Arkowitz, H., & Dozois, D. J. (2009). Adding a motivational interviewing 
pretreatment to cognitive behavioral therapy for generalized anxiety disorder: A 
preliminary randomized controlled trial. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 1106-1117. 
doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2009.07.014 
Wong, J., Gordon, E. A., & Heimberg, R. G. (2012). Social anxiety disorder. In P. Sturmey & M. 
Hersen (Eds.), Handbook of evidence-based practice in clinical psychology: Volume II, 
Adult disorders (pp. 621-649). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
  
